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1 Introduction
The seminal analysis of second price auctions by Vickrey (1961) established that
single or multiple unit discriminatory auctions can be used to implement the socially
efficient allocation in private value models in (weakly) dominant strategies. The
subsequent contributions by Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) showed that the insight
of Vickrey extends to more general allocation problems in private value environments.
By requiring that the transfer payment of agent i match her externality cost on the
remaining agents, agent i internalizes the social objective and is led to report her
type truthfully. The resulting net utility for agent i corresponds to her marginal
contribution to the social value.
In this paper, we generalize the idea of a marginal contribution mechanism to dy-
namic environments with private information. We design an intertemporal sequence
of transfer payments which allow each agent to receive her flow marginal contribu-
tion in every period. In other words, each agent will pay her externality cost in a
time consistent manner. In consequence, each agent is willing to truthfully report her
information in every period.
The basic idea of the dynamic mechanism is first explored in the context of the
sequential allocation of an indivisible object with initially uncertain value to the
bidders. We assume that the initial estimate of the value is private information to
the bidder. In subsequent periods, a bidder receives additional information only in
those periods in which the object is allocated to her. The structure of the payoffs
in the model, and in particular the resolution of uncertainty, therefore resembles the
multi-armed bandit problem.
The first result reports the construction of a dynamically efficient auction that
allocates the object in each period according to the utilitarian welfare criterion under
symmetric but imperfect information. We show that a dynamic second price auction
truthfully implements the socially efficient allocation period by period subject to
Bayesian (and in fact even subject to ex post) incentive constraints. The bandit
framework constitutes a natural setting to analyze the repeated allocation of an object
or a license over time. The key assumption in the multi-armed bandit setting is that
only the current user gains more information about her valuation of the object. If
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we think about the object as a license to use a facility or to explore a resource for a
limited time, it is natural to assume that the current insider gains information relative
to the outsiders. A conceptual advantage of the sequential allocation problem is that
the structure of the socially efficient program is well understood. As the monetary
transfers allow each agent to capture her marginal contribution, the properties of the
social program translate into properties of the marginal program. In the case of the
dynamic auction, we therefore obtain surprisingly explicit and informative expressions
for the intertemporal transfer prices.
The second result is the description of a dynamic Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism
in which each agent receives in every period her flow marginal contribution to the
social value. We obtain the second result for a general specification of the utility of
each agent and the arrival of private information over time. Throughout the paper we
maintain the assumptions of quasi-linear utility and of a private value environment.
The objective of the dynamic mechanism is to implement the socially efficient
policy. With transferable utilities, the social objective is simply to maximize the
expected discounted sum of the individual utilities. The solution to this dynamic
optimization problem is by necessity time consistent. In consequence, the dynamic
Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism is time consistent and the social choice function can
be implemented by a sequential mechanism without any ex ante commitment by the
designer. In contrast, in revenue maximizing problems, the “ratchet effect” leads to
very distinct solutions for mechanisms with and without intertemporal commitment
ability (see Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole (1985)).
In contrast to the static environment, the thruthtelling strategy in the dynamic
setting forms an ex-post equilibrium rather than an equilibrium in weakly dominant
strategies. The weakening of the equilibrium notion is due to the dynamic nature
of the game. If the connection between other agents’ current announcements and
their implications on the future continuation payoffs is broken, then truthtelling is
not necessarily individually optimal.
In recent years, a number of papers have been written with the aim to explore
various issues arising in dynamic allocation problems. Athey and Segal (2006) con-
sider a finite time horizon model with transferable utilities and private values. Their
main result is the construction of a balanced budget mechanism in the finite horizon
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allocation model. Their construction of a rebalancing mechanism is based on a “team
mechanism” in which the monetary transfers are paid only at the terminal period and
are equal to the sum of the other agents’ terminal utilities. In contrast, we design a
sequence of transfers which support the flow marginal contribution as the net utility
of each agent in every period. In consequence we do not need a finite terminal time
to establish the transfers. Bapna and Weber (2005) consider a sequential allocation
problem for a single, indivisible object by a dynamic auction. The basic optimization
problem is a multi-armed bandit problem as in the auction we discuss here. Their
analysis attempts to use the Gittins index of each alternative allocation as a suffi-
cient statistic for the determination of the transfer price. While the Gittins index is
sufficient to determine the efficient allocation in each period, the indices, in partic-
ular the second highest index is typically not a sufficient statistic for the incentive
compatible transfer price. Bapna and Weber (2005) present necessary and sufficient
conditions when an affine but report-contingent combination of indices can represent
the externality cost. In contrast, we consider a direct mechanism and determine the
transfers from general principles of the incentive problem. In particular we do not
require any assumptions beyond the private value environment and transferable util-
ity. In symmetric information environments, Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2003), (2006)
use the notion of marginal contribution to construct efficient equilibria in dynamic
first price auctions. In this paper, we emphasize the role of a time-consistent utility
flow, namely the flow marginal contribution, to encompass environments with private
information.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic auction model.
Section 3 contains the construction of the efficient dynamic auction. Section 4 extends
the construction to general private value environments. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Setting We consider a dynamic auction model in discrete time with an infinite
horizon. In every period t, a single indivisible object can be allocated to a bidder
i ∈ {1, ..., N}. The true valuation of bidder i is given by ωi ∈ Ωi = [0, 1]. The
prior distribution about the valuation ωi is given by Fi (ωi) and the distributions are
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independent across bidders. In period 0, bidder i does not know the realization of ωi,
instead she receives an informative signal s0i ∈ Si = [0, 1] about her true value of the
object. The signal si is generated by a conditional distribution function Gi (si |ωi ). In
each subsequent period t, only the winning bidder in period t− 1 receives additional
information about her valuation ωi in the form of an additional and conditionally
independent signal sti ∈ Si from the conditional distribution Gi (si |ωi ). Each signal
sti is private information to bidder i and is not observed by any other agent.
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We denote the private history of bidder i by hti =
(
s0i , ..., s
t−1
i
)
. The posterior
belief of agent i about ωi can be calculated by Bayes’ rule using h
t
i. The expected
value of the object for bidder i given his private history is denoted by:
vi
(
hti
)
= E
[
ωi
∣∣hti ] .
Each agent i has quasi-linear utility and the net value of getting the object in period
t is
vi
(
hit
)− pti,
where pti is the transfer price paid in period t. Each agent discounts the future with
a common discount factor δ, 0 < δ < 1.
Mechanism A dynamic direct mechanism asks the bidders to report their signals
in every period t. The report ŝti may or may not be truthful. We define the initial
reports by
ĥ0 =
(
ŝ01, ..., ŝ
0
N
)
,
and inductively the history of reports by:
ĥt =
(
ĥt−1, ŝt1, ..., ŝ
t
N
)
.
The set of possible histories of reports in period t is denoted by Ĥ t. The allocation
rule for a dynamic direct revelation mechanism is
xt : Ĥ t → [0, 1]N .
1We describe the arrival of new information as a Bayesian sampling process. The equilibrium
characterization in Theorem 1 would continue to hold for any stochastic process, possibly non-
Markovian, provided that the signal realizations are independent across agents and that signals only
arrive for winning bidders.
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The allocation in period t is a vector xt = (xt1, ..., x
t
N) , where x
t
i denotes the proba-
bility of assigning the object to i in t with
N∑
i=1
xti = 1.
The transfer (or pricing) rule is given by:
pt : Ĥ t → RN .
A dynamic mechanism M =
〈
x,p,Ĥ
〉
is a triple where
x =
{
xt
}∞
t=0
, p =
{
pt
}∞
t=0
and Ĥ =
{
Ĥ t
}∞
t=0
,
are the sequences of public decisions and public reports (histories).
Equilibrium The bidders evaluate payoffs according to the discounted expected
payoff criterion. A reporting strategy for agent i is a mapping
mti : Si → Si.
For a given mechanismM, the expected payoff for bidder i from reporting a sequence
ŝi = {ŝti} of signals given that the others are reporting ŝ−i = {ŝt−i} is given by
E
∞∑
t=0
δt
[
xti
(
ĥt−1, ŝti, ŝ
t
−i
)
vi
(
hti
)− pti (ĥt−1, ŝti, ŝt−i)] .
Given the mechanismM and the reporting strategies ŝ−i, the optimal reporting strat-
egy of bidder i solves a sequential optimization problem which can phrased recursively
in terms of value functions, or
Vi(ĥ
t−1, hti) = max
ŝti∈Si
E
{
xti
(
ĥt−1, ŝti, ŝ
t
−i
)
vi
(
hti
)− pti (ĥt−1, ŝti, ŝt−i)+ δVi (ĥt, ht+1i )} .
We say that the dynamic direct mechanism M is Bayesian incentive compatible, if
for every agent i, in every period t, truthtelling is a best response given that all other
agents report truthfully. In terms of the value function, it means that for all i and
all t, the solution to the dynamic programming equation:
Vi(h
t−1) = max
ŝti∈Si
E
{
xti
(
ht−1, ŝti, s
t
−i
)
vi
(
hti
)− pti (ht−1, ŝti, st−i)+ δVi (ht−1, ŝti, st−i)} .
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is to report truthfully, i.e. to choose ŝti = s
t
i. Finally, we say that the mechanism M
is ex post incentive compatible if truthtelling is a best response for agent i regardless
of the distribution of signals of the other agents, or
si ∈ argmax
ŝti∈Si
{
xti
(
ht−1, ŝti, s
t
−i
)
vi
(
hti
)− pti (ht−1, ŝti, st−i)+ δVi (ht−1, ŝti, st−i)} ,
for all st−i ∈ S−i. In the dynamic context, ex post incentive compatibility has to be
qualified in the sense that is ex post with respect to all signals received in period t,
but not ex post with respect to signals arriving after period t. Consequently, the value
function Vi
(
ht−1, ŝti, s
t
−i
)
is still the future expected value conditional on ht−1, ŝti, s
t
−i.
3 Dynamic Auction
We start with the single good allocation problem and show that it is possible to im-
plement the socially efficient allocation in ex post equilibrium (and hence in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium). The construction resembles to some extent a second price auction
in each period. The transfer price of the winning bidder is calculated in each period
by comparison to the optimal allocation policy within the set of bidders where the
current winner is excluded. As a result, the winning bidder internalizes her effect on
the welfare of other bidders. The transfer price of the loosing bidders will be equal
to zero provided that only the winning bidder receives additional information. The
exact construction of the transfer prices follows the spirit of the Vickrey pricing, but
the intertemporal trade-offs are fully taken into account.
Social Efficiency The socially efficient assignment policy is obtained by maximiz-
ing the utilitarian welfare criterion, namely the expected discounted sum of utilities.
Given a history of signals hs in period s, the socially optimal program can be written
simply as
W (hs) = max
{xt(ht)}∞t=s
E
∞∑
t=s
N∑
i=1
δt−sxti
(
ht
)
vi
(
hti
)
.
Alternatively, we can represent the social program in its recursive form:
W (hs) = max
xs(hs)
E
{
N∑
i=1
xsi (h
s) vi (h
s
i ) + δW (h
s, xs)
}
.
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The expected value EW (hs, xs) represents the optimal continuation value conditional
upon the state hs and the allocation xs today. The socially optimal assignment prob-
lem is a standard multi–armed bandit problem and the optimal policy is characterized
by an index policy (see Gittins (1989) and Whittle (1982) for a textbook introduc-
tion). In particular, we compute for every bidder i the Gittins index based exclusively
on the information about bidder i. The index of bidder i in state hti is the solution
to the following optimal stopping problem:
γi
(
hti
)
= max
τ
E
{∑τ
s=0 δ
svi
(
ht+si
)∑τ
s=0 δ
s
}
.
The socially efficient allocation policy x∗ = {xt∗}∞t=0 is to choose in every period a
bidder i with the maximal index:
xt∗i > 0 if γi
(
hti
) ≥ γj (htj) for all j.
Marginal Contribution In the static Vickrey auction, the price of the winning
bidder is equal to the highest valuation among the loosing bidders. The highest value
among the remaining bidders represents the social opportunity cost of assigning the
object to the winning bidder. In a dynamic framework, the social opportunity cost
is determined by the optimal continuation plan in the absence of the current winner.
It is therefore useful to define the value of the social program after removing bidder
i from the set of agents:
W−i (hs) = max{xt−i(ht)}∞t=s
E
∞∑
t=s
∑
j 6=i
δt−sxtj
(
ht
)
vj
(
htj
)
.
The marginal contribution Mi (h
t) of bidder i at history ht is then naturally defined
by:
Mi
(
ht
)
= W
(
ht
)−W−i (ht) . (1)
The marginal contribution is the change in social value due to the addition of agent
i and hence the possibility of assigning the object to i. The marginal contribution of
agent i may be thought of as the information rent that agent i may be able to secure
for herself in the direct mechanism. If bidder i can secure her marginal contribution in
a time consistent manner, she should be able to receive the flow marginal contribution
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mi (h
t) in every period. The flow marginal contribution accrues incrementally over
each period:
Mi
(
ht
)
= mi
(
ht
)
+ δMi
(
ht, xt∗
)
.
As in the notations of the value functions above, Mi (h
t, xt) represents the marginal
contribution of agent i in the continuation problem conditional on the history ht
and the allocation xt today. The flow marginal contribution can be expressed more
directly using the definition of the marginal contribution (1) as
mi
(
ht
)
= W
(
ht
)−W−i (ht)− δ (W (ht, x∗t)−W−i (ht, xt∗)) . (2)
Dynamic Second Price Auction The flow marginal contribution is a natural
candidate for the net utility that each bidder should receive in each period t. We now
construct a transfer price such that under the efficient allocation, each bidder’s net
payoff coincides with her flow marginal contribution. We then show that this pricing
rule makes truthtelling incentive compatible in the dynamic mechanism.
The winning bidder i receives the object in period t. To match her net payoff to
her flow marginal contribution, we must have:
mi
(
ht
)
= vi
(
ht
)− pi (ht) . (3)
The remaining bidders, j 6= i, do not receive the object in period t and their transfer
price must offset the flow marginal contribution:
mj
(
ht
)
= −pj
(
ht
)
.
Consider first the efficient bidder i in period t. We expand the flow marginal
contribution in (2) by noting that i is the efficient assignment and that another
bidder, say k, would constitute the efficient assignment in the absence of bidder i:
mi
(
ht
)
= vi
(
hti
)− vk (htk)− δ (W−i (ht, i)−W−i (ht, k)) . (4)
The optimal assignment policy is without loss of generality a deterministic policy
as a function of the history. We therefore replace the vector xt by the assignment
decision which determines the identity of the winning bidder. Thus, in (4), W−i (ht, i)
and W−i (ht, k) represent the continuation value of the social program without i,
9
conditional on the history ht and the current assignment being i or k−i respectively.
We notice that with private values, the continuation value of the social program
without i and conditional on ht and giving the object to agent i in period t is simply
equal to the value of the program conditional on ht alone, or
W−i
(
ht, i
)
= W−i
(
ht
)
.
The additional information generated by the assignment to agent i only pertains to
agent i and hence has no value for the allocation problem once i is removed. We can
therefore rewrite the flow marginal contribution of the winning agent i as:
mi
(
ht
)
= vi
(
hti
)− (1− δ)W−i (ht) .
The flow marginal contribution of i is therefore her expected flow value minus the
delay in the accrual of the social benefit arising from the optimal assignment among
all agents excluding agent i. It follows that the transfer price should simply be given
by:
p∗i
(
ht
)
= (1− δ)W−i
(
ht
)
, (5)
which is the flow social opportunity cost of assigning the object today to agent i.
A similar analysis, based on the flow marginal contribution (4) leads to the deter-
mination of the transfer price for the losing bidders. Consider a bidder j who should
not get the object in period t. Her flow utility is clearly zero in period t. Moreover,
by the optimality of the index policy, the removal of alternative j from the set of
possible allocations does not change the optimal assignment today. In consequence,
the identity of the winning bidder does not depend on the presence of alternative j.
In other words the efficient assignment to i will remain efficient after we remove j.
As a result the flow marginal contribution of the loosing bidder is zero, and we have:
p∗j
(
ht
)
= −mj
(
ht
)
= 0.
Theorem 1 (Dynamic Second Price Auction)
The socially efficient allocation rule x∗ is ex post incentive compatible in the dynamic
direct mechanism with the payment rule p∗ where:
p∗j
(
ht
)
=
{
(1− δ)W−j (ht) if xt∗j = 1,
0 if xt∗j = 0.
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Proof. By the unimprovability principle, it is sufficient to prove that if an agent
receives in all future periods her marginal contribution as her continuation value, then
truthtelling is incentive compatible for an agent in period t. Suppose then that at
ht, it is socially efficient to assign the object to agent i and suppose that all agents
except i report truthful. The incentive constraint for agent i is then given by:
vi
(
hti
)− p∗i (ht)+ δMi (ht, i) ≥ δMi (ht, j) (6)
for some j 6= i. By the determination of the transfer price p∗i , it follows that (6) can
be written as follows
Mi
(
ht
) ≥ δMi (ht, j) (7)
and by definition of the marginal contribution, we can rewrite (7) in terms of the
social value functions:
W
(
ht
)−W−i (ht) ≥ δ (W (ht, j)−W−i (ht, j)) ,
and expanding by vi (h
t
i), we have
W
(
ht
)−W−i (ht) ≥ vi (hti)+ δW (ht, j)− vi (hti)− δW−i (ht, j) ,
but then the result is:
W
(
ht
)−W (ht, j) ≥ W−i (ht)−W−i (ht, j) . (8)
The inequality (8) follows from the fact that the size of the loss due to a suboptimal
choice j (weakly) increases in the number of alternatives present.
For the case of an inefficient agent j in period t, we have
Mj
(
ht
) ≥ vj (htj)− pj (ht)+ δMj (ht, j) . (9)
As the transfer price is independent of the report of agent j, and given by (5), we can
rewrite (9) as follows
Mj
(
ht
) ≥ vj (htj)− (1− δ)W−j (ht)+ δMj (ht, j) .
After replacing the marginal contributions by the social value functions, we have
W
(
ht
)−W−j (ht) ≥ vj (htj)− (1− δ)W−j (ht)+ δ (W (ht, j)−W−j (ht, j)) .
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But as W−j (ht, j) =W−j (ht), the terms involving the value functions of −j all drop
out and we are left with
W
(
ht
) ≥ vj (htj)+ δW (ht, j) , (10)
which is a valid inequality since j is by hypothesis not the efficient choice in period
t.
The incentive compatible pricing rule has a few interesting implications. First,
we observe that in the case of two bidders, the formula for the dynamic second price
reduces to the static solution. If we remove one bidder, the social program has no other
choice but to always assign it to the remaining bidder. But then, the expected value
of that assignment policy is simply equal to the expected value of the object for bidder
j in period t by the martingale probability of the Bayesian posterior. In other words,
the transfer is equal to the current expected value of the next best competitor. With
more than two bidders, the social program without bidder i will contain an option
value due to the possibility of assigning the object to the more favorable bidder. In
consequence the social opportunity cost is higher than the highest expected valuation
among the remaining bidders.
Second, we observe that the transfer price of the winning bidder is independent of
her own information about the object. This means, that for any number of periods
in which the ownership of the object does not change, the transfer price will stay
constant as well, even though the valuation of the object by the winning bidder may
undergo substantial change.
The design of the transfer price pursued the objective to match the flow marginal
contribution of every agent in every period. The determination of the transfer price
is based exclusively on the reported signals of the other agents, rather than their true
signals. For this reason, truthtelling is not only Bayesian incentive compatible, but
ex post incentive compatible, if we qualify ex post to mean conditional on all signals
received up to and including period t.
An important insight from the static analysis of the private value environment is
the fact that incentive compatibility can be guaranteed in weakly dominant strategies.
This strong result does not carry over into the dynamic setting due to the interaction
of the strategies. In a dynamic setting, each agent can condition her strategy on the
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past reports of the other agents. In particular, the strategy of truthtelling after all
histories fails to be a weakly dominant strategy as it removes the ability to respond
to past announcements. Yet our argument shows that the weaker condition of ex post
incentive compatibility can be satisfied.
The vital assumption in the dynamic auction model pertained to the flow of
information: Each bidder receives additional private information in period t + 1 if
and only if she received the object in period t. This is the essential informational
hypothesis in multi-armed bandit framework. Yet we might be interested in a setting
in which each bidder may learn more about the value of the object even in periods
in which she does not control the object. The incentive analysis is again based on
the flow marginal contribution. But once we leave the bandit framework, then some
loosing bidders may have to pay a positive price even in periods in which they do
not receive the object. Consider a loosing bidder j and suppose that the removal of
bidder j would change the efficient assignment policy from agent i to agent k. The
flow contribution of the loosing bidder j would now be equal to:
mj
(
ht
)
= vi
(
hti
)− vk (htk)+ δ (W−j (ht, i)−W−j (ht, k)) < 0.
In other words, if the presence of j changes the efficient assignment policy, then this
leads to an externality cost created by agent j and hence strictly positive transfer
prices even in periods in which agent j does not receive the object.
4 General Private Value Environment
In this section we extend the private value environment from a single unit auction
to a general allocation model. In addition, we substantially generalize the statistical
model of information. The net expected flow utility of agent i in period t is now
determined by the (flow) allocation at ∈ A, the private history hti and the transfer
price pti:
vi
(
at, hti
)− pti.
The utility function vi represents the expected utility to agent i from an allocation
at given the private information hti. The set of available allocations is given by a
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compact and time invariant set A. The private signal of agent i in period t + 1 is
generated according to a conditional distribution function:
st+1i ∼ Gi
(
st+1i
∣∣at, hti ) .
We generalize the information flow by allowing the signal st+1i of agent i in period
t+1 to be dependent on the current allocative decision at and the entire past history
of private signals received by agent i. The allocation rule for the direct mechanism is
now given by
xt : Ĥ t → ∆(A) ,
and the transfer rules are given by:
pt : Ĥ t → RN .
As before, we denote the socially efficient policy by x∗ = {xt∗}∞t=0. The direct dynamic
mechanism M =
〈
x∗,p∗,Ĥ
〉
extends the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism to gen-
eral intertemporal environments by the marginal contribution argument as developed
earlier in the context of the single unit allocation problem.
Theorem 2 (Dynamic Vickrey Groves Clark Mechanism)
The socially efficient allocation rule {x∗} is ex post incentive incentive compatible
with the payment rule p∗:
pt∗i
(
x∗
(
ht
)
, ht−i
)
= mi
(
ht
)− vi (x∗ (ht) , hti) . (11)
Proof. The basic idea of the proof generalizes the marginal contribution argument
in Theorem 1. By the unimprovability principle, it suffices to prove that if agent i
will receive as her continuation value her marginal contribution, then truthtelling is
incentive compatible for agent i in period t, or:
vi
(
x∗
(
ht
)
, hti
)−pti (x∗ (ht) , ht−i)+δMi (x∗ (ht) , ht) ≥ vi (a, hti)−pti (a, ht)+δMi (ht, a) ,
(12)
for all i, t and a ∈ A. By construction of the transfer price, the lhs of (12) represents
the marginal contribution of agent i. Similarly, we can express the continuation
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marginal contributionMi (h
t, a) in terms of the values of the different social programs:
W
(
ht
)−W−i (ht) ≥ vi (a, hti)− pti (a, ht−i)+ δ (W (ht, a)−W−i (ht−i, a)) . (13)
By construction of the transfer price, we can represent the price that agent i would
have to pay if allocation a were to be chosen in terms of the marginal contribution if
the reported history hti were the true signal received by agent i. By construction, we
have as in (11):
pt∗i
(
x∗
(
ht
)
, ht
)
= mi
(
ht
)− vi (x∗ (ht) , hti) .
The flow marginal contribution of agent i is given by
mi
(
hti, h
t
−i
)
=
I∑
j=1
vj
(
a, hti, h
t
−i
)−∑
j 6=i
vj
(
x∗−i, h
t
−i
)
+δ
(
W−i
(
ht−i, a
)−W−i (ht−i, x∗−i)) .
(14)
so that the price is given by:
pti
(
ht
)
=
∑
j 6=i
vj
(
x∗−i, h
t
−i
)−∑
j 6=i
vj
(
a, hti, h
t
−i
)
+ δ
(
W−i
(
ht−i, x
∗
−i
)−W−i (ht−i, a)) .
(15)
We can now insert the prices into (13) to obtain:
W
(
ht
)−W−i (ht−i) ≥
vi
(
a, ht
)−(∑
j 6=i
vj
(
x∗−i, h
t
−i
)−∑
j 6=i
vj
(
a, hti, h
t
−i
)
+ δW−i
(
ht−i, x
∗
−i
))
+ δ
((
W
(
ht, a
)))
.
But now we can reconstitute the entire expression in terms of the social value of the
program with and without agent i and we are lead to the final inequality:
W
(
ht
)−W−i (ht−i) ≥ W (ht, a)−W−i (ht−i) ,
where the later is true by the optimality of x∗ at ht.
We observe that the pricing rule (11) for agent i depends on the report of agent i
only through the determination of the social allocation which already appeared as a
prominent feature in the static environment. Theorem 2 gives a general characteriza-
tion of the transfer prices. In specific environment (such as a public good provision
model), we can then gain additional insights into the structure of the efficient transfer
prices by analyzing how the policies would change with the addition or removal of an
arbitrary agent i.
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5 Conclusion
This paper suggest the construction of a direct dynamic mechanism in private value
environments with transferable utility. The design of the monetary transfers relies on
the notions of marginal contribution and flow marginal contribution. These notions
allow us to transfer the insights of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism from a static
environment to general dynamic settings. In the case of the sequential allocation of
a single indivisible object, we show that the notion of marginal contribution and its
relationship to the social program allow us to give explicit solutions of the monetary
transfers in each period.
Many interesting questions are left open. The dynamic mechanism considered
here satisfies the incentive compatibility and individual participation constraints in
every period. In particular, we do not require that the monetary transfer satisfy a
balanced budget condition in every period. The recent analysis of Athey and Segal
(2006) suggests that a sequential version of AGV mechanism might be able to achieve
budget balancing in every period as well. This paper is silent on the issue of revenue
maximizing mechanisms. In order to make progress in that direction, a characteriza-
tion of implementable allocations in dynamic setting will first be necessary. Finally,
we restricted our attention to private value environments. A recent literature, be-
ginning with Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) showed how to extend
the VCG mechanism to interdependent value environments. In dynamic settings, the
single crossing condition will then typically involve a dynamic element which will
introduce some complications. These tasks are left for future research.
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